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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Keith Jorgensen's Magnavox Entertainment Center obtained a judgment against defendant Craig Clark in the sum
of $4,986.27 plus costs having sued Appellant pursuant to
section 70A-2-709, Utah Code Annotated, as
for the price.

amended, action

Appellant Clark and wife signed an Instal-

ment Sale Contract on or about August 16, 1976 to purchase
a Model 284 Thomas organ and refused to make any payments
under the agreement.

Plaintiff Jorgensen obtained judgment

for the full purchase price of the Thomas organ and defendant Clark appeals that judgment.

The issue primarily

centers around the appropriate measure of damages.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Trial Court, Honorable John F. Wahlquist presiding
sittingwith a jury,

granted

Clark after a one day trial.

judgment against defendant Craig
Motion for a new trial by

defendant Clark was denied as was motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Appellant's counterclaim for

storage was denied and not submitted to the jury.

The jury

answered several Interrogatories and the Trial Court entered
judgment after memorandums were submitted.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant Clark seeks reversal of the judgment of
the lower Court or in the alternative granting a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant Clark saw an ad on television promoting
Thomas organs at Keith Jorgensen Magnavox Center.

He called
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their downtown store in Salt Lake City and inquired in general
about their Thomas organs for sale.
wife played the organ.

Neither Appellant nor his

The same day, Saturday, August 14, 1976,

Appellant drove from his horne in Roy, Utah to respondents
store in Salt Lake to examine their merchandise.
Appellant was taken to the Fashion Place Mall location
after hours, to examine organs having first inspected organs
at Respondent's downtown store.

Appellant wanted time to think

about bu¥ing an organ and requested time to do so (R 86).
Respondent's employee suggested a free horne trial offer.

A

new model 284 Thomas organ was delivered to Appellant on a
free home trial basis by Respondent's employees.

The organ

was delivered that same night at approximately 11:30 p.m.
Employees of Respondent left Appellant's horne approximately
1:00 a.m. on August 15, 1976 after demonstrating the organ to
Appellant.
Store employees arrived on Monday, August 16, 1976
at 7:00p.m. at Appellant's horne to see if Appellant had
decided to purchase the organ.

Appellant and his wife were not

ready to purchase the organ at that time.

Appellant's wife

was basically against the idea (R 90).
Appellant and his wife were talked into driving to
Salt Lake to look at other organs that same night, August
16, 1976.

The parties arrived as the Fashion Place Mall

was closing.

Two employees of Respondent waited on Appellant

and his wife as they perused Thomas organs.

Although Appellant's

wife was against the idea, Appellant together with his wife
signed an Installment Sale Contract to purchase a Thomas
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that night from Respondent's two employees (R 92).
Appellant wanted to arrange his own financing but
was told the store arranges its own financing (R 93).

The

agreement was then signed by Appellant and his wife to purchase the organ that was left in their home.

Appellant

left the Fashion Place Mall store approximately 10:30 p.m.,
the evening of August 16, 1976.
Appellant, deciding he had made a mistake, called
respondent's Fashion Place store in less than two days
stating he would return the organ to the store or respondent
could pick it up.
Respondent's employee, Mark Wilkey, acknowledged that
Appellant called within two days after signing the agreement
offering to return the organ or Respondent come pick it up
(R 54).

Mark Wilkey acknowledged several other phone calls

by Appellant to the same effect.

Mr. Wilkey referred the

matter to his supervisor, Greg Jukes.

No decisions were

ever reached by Respondent to allow Appellant to return the
organ or that Respondent would pick up the organ.
requests were ignored by Respondent.

Appellant's

Interestingly, Mark

Wilkey admits that Respondent teaches its employees to
place an organ in the home

of reluctant purchasers.

It

seems the psychology of placing the organ in the home somehow
makes the would be purchaser somewhat reluctant to have the
same removed from his home and places something of a moral
obligation on the buyer (R 33).

Also, Mark Wilkey admits

two salesmen waited on Ap?ellant at all times and further
admitted there was some degree of pressure applied to cause
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Employees are on

a straight commission.

Appellant called every other day speaking to a
variety of sales people over his request to return the organ.
After approximately two weeks of calling, Greg Jukes informed
Appellant Respondent was not going to take back the organ.
Appellant did not make any monthly payments pursuant to the
Installment Sale Agreement.

The only sum paid by

was a down payment of $310.00 on August 16, 1976.
nor his

~ife

~ppellant

Appellant

have ever used the organ and it is stored in

Appellant's home as they have refused to use it (R 99).
There is no defect in the particular organ and it appears
to operate satisfactorily.
POINT ONE
RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED
TO AN ACTION FOR THE PRICE
UNDER 70A-2-709
Appellant effectively rejected the goods within a
reasonable time precluding acceptance and action for the
price under Section 70A-2-709.

Upon delivery of merchandise

a buyer under the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, has an
opportunity

to inspect the goods, not only for their

conformity, but also as to whether he wants to take them
at all.
(l)

See 70A-2-606 UCA, as ammended.

Section

70A-2~606

(a) gives the buyer a reasonable opportunity to inspect

the goods and to signify acceptance by some means.
Section 70A-2-606

(l)

Importantly,

(b) allows the buyer a reasonable

opportunity to inspect the goods and make an effective rejection
before acceptance can occur.
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course wrongful, and gives rise to non-price remedies for
the seller, as in 70A-2-708, but it does not amount to an
acceptance so long as the 3ta tutory procedural requisi ties
for an "effective rejection have been met".
70A-2-606

(l)

(b) and Section 70A-2-709

See Section

{3).

See White and Summers, Uniform Commercial Code,
\'lest Publishing Company, 1972, Chapter 7, dealing with
Action For the Price-Goods Accepted,page 211,
The most troubling case is the one in
which the buyer has no substantive basis
on which to reject or revoke but he nevertheless effectively rejects or revokes
procedurally, that is, he acts in time and
properly communicates his rejection or revocation to the seller. All commentators
agree that the Code draftsmen comtemplated
effective rejections which might be
substantively wrongful and intended that
all such rejections forestall acceptance
without regard to their substantive wrongfulness.
Writing for the New York Law
Revision Commission, Professor Honnold
stated: "Buyer may have the power to make
an 'effective' rejection even though his
action is a breach of contract and subjects
buyer to liability for damages.
Professor
Honnold's judgment is consistent with the
negative implication of 2-606 {1) (b) which
provides that failure to make an 'effective
rejection' results in acceptance.
The
negative implication of that subsection is
that any effective rejection bars acceptance-.--We conclude therefore, that a procedurally proper (that is, effective) rejection forestalls acceptance whether or
not the rejection is rightful (that is,
founded upon a proper substantive basis).
This conclusion is consistent with the
policy behind 2-709, which normally imposes
the burden of redisposing of the goods upon
the seller.
Appellant Clark by effectively cornrnurnicating to respondent
his rejection of the organ precluded action for the price
under 70A-2-709.

Communication was undeniably received
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and he would bring it to Respondent's place of
or Respondent may pick it up.

business

This rejection was within

two days after signing the Installment Sale Agreement,
not an unreasonable time to inspect the goods and communicate an effective rejection to Respondent.

Appellant

had the organ in his home only a total of four days
before communicating his rejection to Respondent.
Respondent had a remedy under Section 70A-2-708
for nona9ceptance and could have recovered the difference
between the market price at the time and place for tender
and the unpaid contract price together with any incidental
damages.

Instead it choose specific performance, that

is, action for the total price.
According to 3A Bender's Uniform Commercial Code
Service Seller's Action For The Price Section 13.06, page
13-76'
When there is a rejection of goods, the
buyer is not exercising any control or
dominion over them, whether the rejection
is rightful or wrongful.
In essence, it
would be essential for the seller, regardless of the cause of the rejection, to
recover the goods from the carrier, bailee
or the buyer.
He should take the appropriate
action necessary to accomplish this purpose.
See, also, Peters,"Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to Sale of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial
Code:
19 9 ,

A

Road Map for Article 2," 73 Yale Law Journal

2 41 e t seq .

(19 53 ) ,

Upon arrival, the buyer has an opportunity to
inspect the goods, not only for their comformity, but also as to whether he wants to take
them at all.
Rejection of a totally
conforming tender is of course wrongful,
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tance so long as the statutory procedural
requisites for an "effective" rejection
have been met.
Clearly, when there has been a right or wrongful rejection of the goods, the seller has an obligation to
recover the goods in question and he should take the
appropriate action necessary to accomplish this purpose.
All authors agree the seller is further entitled to his
non-price remedies.
-One who rejects in an effective manner is not
liable under Section 70A-2-709 even though this may be
a wrongful act.
tion.

Section 70A-2-602 UCA deals with rejec-

Rejection of goods must only be made within a reason-

able time after the delivery or tender.
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POINT TWO
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
NOT SUBMITTING DEFENDANT'S
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Appellant Clark submitted several (20) proposed
jury instructions which were all rejected by the Trial
Court as "argumentative".

The Trial Court did not alter,

amend or substitute for Appellant proposed instructions
and thereby effectively prevented Appellant's theories
from

go~ng

before the jury.

Appellant's proposed Jury Instruction No. 1 is
a restatement of 70A-2-709 in its entirety.

Respondent.

admitted during the course of the trial that it was suing
under Section 70A-2-709.

Appellant should have been

allowed to have argued that Respondent had not proved all
of the essential elements under Section 70A-2-709.

That

is, Respondent should have been required to prove (1)
the goods were accepted (70A-2-709 (1)

(a)) and that

the goods were not rejected by Appellant (70A-2-709

(3)).

The Trial Court did not require the Respondent to meet its
burden of proof on all the essential elements of Section
70A-2-709.
It seems elementary that if Respondent's theory
was for the price under 70A-2-709, the statute, or its
restatement, should have been submitted to the jury to
decide if the facts warranted a remedy under Section
70A-2-709.
~ore

importantly, counsel would have had an

opportunity to argue the elements or lack thereof to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Jury Instruction No. 2 was also rejected by the
Court as "argumentative".
Section 70A-2-706.

Instruction No. 2 sets forth

A remedy which is available to Respon-

dent if the case is not a proper action for the price.
Appellant was effectively prevented from arguing that
other remedies were available to Respondent, other
than action for the price.
The Trial Court failed to instruct the jury of
the

ava~lability

of Section 70A-2-708, regarding damages

for non-acceptance.

Appellant's proposed instruction

No. 1 refers to section 70A-2-708 indicating, a seller who
is held not entitled to the price under this section
shall nevertheless be awarded damages for nonacceptance
under the preceding section,

(70A-2-708).

Appellant took exception to the court failing to
instruct the jury as requested (R 120-123).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT THREE
TRIAL COURT'S JURY
INSTRUCTIONS WERE INADEQUATE
The Trial Court did not submit one instruction
to the jury concerning formation of a contract, acceptance
of the goods, rejection of the goods, damages, and availability of other remedies to Respondent.
Two Interrogatories were submitted to the jury concerning selling techniques of merchants to persuade buyers
to purchase goods.

These Interrogatories are totally

inadequate to present to the jury the issue of rejection
of the goods and preclusion of 70A-2-709 as a remedy.
Appellant took exception to the lack of proper
jury instructions submitted to the trier of fact

(R 122).

The Trial Court did not submit to the jury for
its factual determination whether Respondent had proved
by a preponderance of the evidence all of the essential
elements of an action for the price, which necessarily
includes proof of acceptance or lack of effective rejection.
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POINT FOUR
INTERROGATORY NO. 2 SUBMITTED
BY THE TRIAL COURT IS AN
ERRONEOUS STATEMENT OF THE
MEASURE OF DAMAGES
The Trial Court, in Question No. 2, asked the jury
to find,
What value do you find proven by a preponderance of the evidence the organ would
have brought if sold on a "forced sale"
basis at or about the time the defendant
denounced the contract?
Value: $ ____________
Explanation:
If there was a market for such an item,
such as a market for used cars at an auction,
then the Court needs to know what the actual
value was at that time.
The Trial Court has

erroneously stated the measure of damages

by asking the jury to find the value of the organ on a
"forced sale" basis.

Under Section 70A-2-708, the measure

of damages for non-acceptance is the difference between
the market price at the time and place for tender and the
unpaid contract price together with any incidental damages.
The Court did not ask the jury to determine the
market price at the time and place of tender.

Nor did it

ask the jury to determine any incidental expenses.
There is no explanation where the Court came up with
its own measure of damages, that is sale on a "forced sale"
basis.
The measure of damages under 70A-20-706 is the difference between the resale price and the contract price together with any incidental damages when the resale is made
in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner.

There

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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basis.

Interestingly, both Appellant and Respondent objected

to the granting of this Interrogatory to the jury (R 122 and
R 119).

The jury placed a figure of $2,600.00 on the value
of the organ if sold on a "forced sale" basis.
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POINT FIVE
THE TRIAL COURT DETEru1INED
DAMAGES PRE-EMPTING THE JURY
Even though the jury detemined that the organ
would sell for $2,600.00 on a "forced sale" basis the Court
ruled that Respondent was entitled to a judgment for the full
price, plus interest at the rate of 16.25% interest from
the date of the agreement August 16, 1976 to the date of the
judgment February 5, 1979, plus $917.50 attorney fees.

In-

terest for over two years at 16.25% interest is computed to
be $1,165.77.

Total judgment awarded was $4,986.27.

Appellant had requested a jury trial and as such the
jury should have determined the damages, if any, awarded to
the Respondent and against Appellant.
If credit

for $2,600.00, computed on a "forced sale"

basis, had been given to Respondent, the judgment balance
would have been $303.00 plus interest and attorney fees.
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POINT SIX
THE ISSUE OF REJECTION
AND ACCEPTANCE WAS A QUESTION
OF FACT TO BE DETERMINED BY THE
JURY NOT BY THE COURT
Contrary to the requests of Ap?ellant no jury
instruction or Interrogatory was submitted by the Trial Court
to determine the factual issue of rejection or acceptance of
the organ.
Appellant submitted to the Court Proposed Jury
Instruction No.

l but it was rejected by the Trial Court

as being "argumentative".

The Trial court did not submit

to the jury the issue of whether the organ had been rejected,
or in the alternative accepted, by Appellant.

The Trial

Court ruled in its Hemorandum Decision the organ had been
accepted by Appellant.

In its decision, the Trial Court

stated, "under the new Consumer Protection Statutes,
the plaintiff may still sue for the purchase price when the
merchandise has in fact been examined and accepted and
where the merchandise is not in any way deficient."
It is not known what the Trial Court meant by new
Consumer Protection Statutes.

The only law relied upon by

Appellant is the Uniform Commercial Code adopted and interpreted by the State of Utah.
The issue of rejection or acceptance should have been
submitted to the jury.

The Trial

Court effectively prevented

Appellant's arguments to the jury by not allowing them to
decide the issue.
Questions of acceptance or rejection of goods are to
be resolved by the finder of fact and depend upon ascertainSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ment of the intent of the parties, Chrysler Corporation vs.
Adamitic, Inc.

208 N.vl. 2d 97, 59 Wis, 2d 219

(1973).

\"/hat constitutes a conforming delivery, acceptance,
rejection, or revocation of acceptance, with respect to the
sale of goods or questions of fact to be determined within
the frame work of the facts in each particular case, Marine
Mart, Inc.

vs.

Pearce 480 S.W. 2d 133, 252 Ark. 601 (1962).

Also, in Trio Estates, Limited

vs.

Dyson 178 S.E.

2d 778, _10 N.C. App. 375 (1971), where the Buyer admitted
purchase and receipt of a machine and that he did not make
installment payments, denial by Buyer of any indebtedness
to

Selle~

raised an issue as to whether the Buyer had accepted

the machine, which issue should have been determined by the
jury from a consideration of all of the evidence in connection with the statute relating to acceptance of goods.
Reference is also made to Cervitor Kitchens, Inc.
vs.

Chapman 500 P. 2d 783, 7 Wash. App. 520 (1972), holding

if facts are disputed, question of what is a reasonable time
for Buyer to inspect delivered goods before he will have
been deemed to have accepted them and question as to whether
Buyer's acts after delivery are inconsistent with Seller's
ownership are for trier of the fact.
Also, of importance is Dehahn

vs.

Innes, Me. 356 A.

2d 711 (1976), holding whether there is an acceptance of goods by
reason of acts of the Buyer inconsistent with the Seller's
ownership is a question of fact for trier of the facts to be
determined from the evidence in each particular case.
Determination of whether actions of the Buyer amounting
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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case, is generally made by the trier of the fact, overlapping
considerations of whether the Buyer gave notice within reasonable time and whether Buyer treated goods in a manner inconsistent with Seller's ownership, Specific Products, Inc.
Great Western Plywood, LDT., Tex. Civ. App. 528

s.w.

vs.

2d 286

(1975) .
Possession does not mean acceptance under Section
70A-2-606, see Zabriskie Chevrolet Inc.

vs.

Smith

240 A.

2d 195,_99 N.J. Super 441 (1968).
From the cases cited herein, it is clear that it is
a jury question whether there has been an effective rejection
or acceptance of the goods and the same is certainly to be
determined by the trier of the fact.

In this case, the Court

effectively prevented the Buyer, Craig Clark, from arguing
lack of acceptance by failing to submit Proposed Jury Instruction No. 1 and the Court failed to present to the jury, any
opportunity to rule upon whether acceptance or rejection had
been made in this case.
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POINT SEVEN
RESPONDENT WAS NOT REQUIRED
BY THE TRIAL COURT TO ~ffiET ITS
BURDEN OF PROOF ON ALL THE ELEMENTS
Appellant filed a general denial stating

Respondent

failed to state a claim against him upon which the Trial
Court could grant relief.

This placed the burden of proof

on the Respondent to prove all the essential elements of
an action for price.
Appella~t

Those elements include that (1)

did not effectively reject the goods and (2)

that Appellant accepted the goods.
Appellant put on evidence before the Trial Court
that he had called Respondent's employees two days after
signing the Installment Sale Agreement rejecting the goods.
This testimony was acknowledged by the Respondent's witness
Mark l'iilkey.
Accordingly, Respondent was called to meet its
burden of proof on all the essential elements for an action
for price.

The Trial Court's instructions do not require

the Respondent to meet its burden of proof as it failed to
submit the issues of rejection and acceptance to the jury
for its factual determination.

In Trio Estates, Limited

vs.

Dyson 178 S.E. 2d 778, 19 N.C. App. 375 (1971), where the Buyer
admitted purchase and receipt of a machine and that he did not
make installment payments, denial by Buyer of any indebtedness
to Seller raised an issue as to whether the Buyer had accepted
the machine, which issue should have been determined by the jury
from a consideration of all of the evidence.
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CONCLUSION
It is res?ectfully submitted the judgment granted
by the Trial Court should be reversed and set aside.

Further,

that a directed verdict of no cause of action in Appellant's
favor and against Respondent should be issued, or in the alternative, grant a new trial to Appellant.
Respondent is not entitled to an action under
Section 70A-2-709 for the reasons that respondent has not
met its burden of proof regarding issues of rejection and acceptance.

Also, Respondent is not entitled to an action for

price under 70A-2-709 as the Uniform Commercial Code

specifically

contemplated wrongful rejections precluding action for the price
and limiting damages to non-acceptance sections.

Appellant has

the right to reject the Thomas organ in question precluding
Respondent's action for the price.
Appellent is entitled to a new trial because of the
failure to submit appropriated jury instructions concerning
issues of rejection and acceptance.

Also, the Trial Court

committed error in stating the jury should determine what
price the organ would bring on a "forced sale" basis.

Finally,

the Trial Court determined the damages and not the jury
contrary to Appellant's demand for a jury trial.
Respectfully Submitted,

RO
Attorney for Appellant Crai
2650 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401

Clark

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-18Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

